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SPRING, 1962

NUMBER 3

THE MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN NEW YORK AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS*
Richard B. Lillicht

The period of time within which to institute a malpractice action is
governed in New York by section 50(1) of the Civil Practice Act which

provides, inter alia, that an action to recover damages for malpractice
"must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has
accrued ....I" Since the statute does not define "malpractice," the courts
in construing the term initially looked to nineteenth-century judicial
usage,' which restricted the term to the professional negligence of physi-

cians and surgeons."
As viewed by the Court of Appeals, section 50(1), "in so far as it

prescribes a limitation in actions to recover damages for malpractice,
refers to actions to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from

the misconduct of physicians, surgeons and others practicing a profession similar to those enumerated." 4 Under this "open end" approach,
* The basic research for this article was completed by the author while serving as
Research Consultant to the New York State Law Revision Commission. Research
assistance, especially for the section "Jurisprudence of other States," was furnished by
Donald L. Horowitz, Esq., of the New York Bar.
t See contributors' section, masthead p. 441, for biographical data.
I Malpractice was made a separate cause of action by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1900, ch. 117,
§ 1, which amended the Code of Civil Procedure § 384(1), the forerunner of Section 50(1).
Before this amendment such an action fell under the Code of Civil Procedure § 383(5),
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1877, ch. 416, § 1, which stipulated a three year period for an action "to
recover damages for a personal injury resulting from negligence." Burrell v. Preston,
54 Hun 70, 7 N.Y. Supp. 177 (Sup. Ct. Livingston County 1889). The Court of Appeals
prior to 1900 repeatedly used the term "malpractice" when referring to the professional
negligence of physicians and surgeons. Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760
(1898); Link v. Sheldon, 136 N.Y. 1, 32 N.E. 696 (1892); DuBois v. Decker, 130 N.Y.
325, 29 N.E. 313 (1891); Carpenter v. Blake, 75 N.Y. 12 (1878).
2 "Just what professions were intended to be benefited is left to conjecture save insofar
as judicial discussion and consideration had sanctioned a general use of the word."
Hurlburt v. Gillett, 96 Misc. 585, 588, 161 N.Y. Supp. 994, 995 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1916),
aff'd on opinion below, 176 App. Div. 893, 162 N.Y. Supp. 1124 (2d Dep't 1916).
3 See cases cited at note 1 supra. See also Bellinger v. Craigue, 31 Barb. 534 (N.Y.
1860) and Lynch v. Davis, 12 How. Prac. 323 (N.Y. 1855). Compare note 11 infra.
4 Federal Int'l Banking Co. v. Touche, 248 N.Y. 517, 518, 162 N.E. 507, 508 (1928).
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dentists,' psychiatrists, 6 chiropractors, 7 pharmacists8 and X-ray technicians9 are within the section, while nurses and hospital employees,"0 as
well as attorneys" and accountants, 2 fall without.
The malpractice statute of limitations being a comparatively short
statute, 3 the extent of its coverage is of considerable interest to those
contemplating or involved in a malpractice action. 1 4 Even more important is ascertaining when the permissible period for bringing such an
action begins to run. This article is primarily concerned with the latter
problem.
THE NEW YORK RULE'3

The two year period for bringing a malpractice action in New York
commences running when "the cause of action has accrued."-' In the
absence of an express provision that the action accrues only upon the
patient's discovery of the injury, 17 the New York courts have consistently held that the action accrues at the time of the acts of the physician
which constitute the malpractice.'"
5 Budoff v. Kessler, 284 App. Div. 1049, 135 N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dep't 1954); Doniger v.
Berger, 241 App. Div. 23, 271 N.Y. Supp. 30 (1st Dep't 1934); Tulloch v. Haselo, 218
App. Div. 313, 218 N.Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dep't 1926); Hurlburt v. Gillett, 96 Misc. 585,
161 N.Y. Supp. 994 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), aff'd on opinion below, 176 App. Div.
893, 162 N.Y. Supp. 1124 (2d Dep't 1916).
6 Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
7 Monahan v. Devinny, 223 App. Div. 547, 229 N.Y. Supp. 60 (3d Dep't 1928).
8 Rudman v. Bancheri, 260 App. Div. 957, 23 N.Y.S.2d 584 (2d Dep't 1940).
9 Leitch v. Mulcahy, 177 Misc. 1077, 31 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
1o Isenstein v. Malcomson, 227 App. Div. 66, 236 N.Y. Supp. 641 (lst Dep't 1929);
Wolff v. Jamaica Hosp., 11 App. Div. 2d 801, 205 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1960).
11 O'Neill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 865 (1929); Camp v.
Reeves, 209 App. Div. 488, 205 N.Y. Supp. 259 (1st Dep't 1924), aff'd mem., 240 N.Y.
672, 148 N.E. 753 (1925). The term "malpractice" has been used with respect to attorneys
in disbarment proceedings. Matter of Baum, 55 Hun 611, 8 N.Y. Supp. 771 (2d Dep't
1890); Matter of Yates, 4 Johns. 317, 367 (N.Y. 1809). Courts have also used the term
loosely in civil actions against attorneys based upon professional negligence. Goldberg v.
Bosworth, 29 Misc. 2d 1057, 215 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961). There is
little doubt, however, that § 50(1) is inapplicable in such situations. Peters v. Powell,
22 Misc. 2d 509, 196 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1960). See generally Note, 3
Brooklyn L. Rev. 284 (1934). But see Comm. on Medical jurisprudence, Report on
Amendment to Statute of Limitations Relating to Malpractice Suits, 13 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A.'465, 468 (1958) (minority report).
12 Federal Int'l Banking Co. v. Touche, 248 N.Y. 517, 162 N.E. 507 (1928).
13 The negligence statute of limitations in New York is three years (N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 49(6)), while the contract and fraud statutes are six years (N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§§ 48(1), (5)).
14 Note, 21 St. John's L. Rev. 77 (1946).
15 See generally Reich, "The Statute of Limitations Applicable to Malpractice Actions in
New York," 11 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 190 (1956); The Statute of Limitations in
Malpractice Actions, Leg. Doc. No. 65(E) at 39-46, Report N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n at
167-74 (1942).
16 See text accompanying note 1 supra.
17 Cf. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 48(5), which expressly states that a cause of action for
fraud is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud.
18 See, e.g., Golia v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 6 App. Div. 2d 884, 177 N.Y.S.2d
550 (2d Dep't 1958), aff'd mem., 7 N.Y.2d 931, 165 N.E.2d 578, 197 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1960);
Budoff v. Kessler, 284 App. Div. 1049, 135 N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dep't 1954); Ranalli v.
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Conklin v. Draper9 is the leading case. A physician, while operating
upon the plaintiff for appendicitis on May 27, 1925, closed the incision
leaving a pair of arterial forceps behind. After two years, during which
time she experienced symptoms of il-health, an X-ray photograph taken
by another doctor disclosed the presence of the forceps. The next day,
July 13, 1927, a second operation was performed and the forceps removed. Plaintiff commenced her action on July 5, 1929, within two
years of the discovery of the forceps, but not within two years after
the operation by the physician. The Appellate Division granted the
physician's motion to dismiss the cause of action.
The action was not commenced until four year after the operation took
place and after the defendant attended and rendered services to the
plaintiff. The time within which to bring such an action being limited
to two years, the Statute of Limitations is a bar....
The plaintiff argues that the statute should begin to run from the
time of the discovery of the malpractice. The decisions setting forth
the purpose and effect of such statute are to the contrary....so
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the physician's knowledge
that the forceps remained in her and his concealment thereof constituted an act of continuing malpractice, tolling the statute of limitations
until either the physician performed his duty or the plaintiff learned
or should have learned of her condition."'
Under this strict approach, as one notewriter observed twenty years
ago:
[A] plaintiff can bring an action for malpractice only if he has been fortunate enough to discover the wrong within two years after its commission.
Even though a failure to become aware of the injury to his person within
this period of time is not due to any lack of diligence on his part, the
action is nevertheless barred and plaintiff left without a satisfactory means
of redress.P
Three recent cases illustrate the point.
In Budoff v. Kessler 3 a drill was left imbedded in one of the plaintiff's teeth during the course of dental work ending May 6, 1952. X-rays
Breed, 251 App. Div. 750, 297 N.Y. Supp. 688 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd mem, 277 N.Y.
630, 14 N.E.2d 195 (1938) ; Rokita v. Germaine, 12 Misc. 2d 84, 176 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1958), aff'd, 8 App. Div. 2d 620, 185 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't 1959);
Nervick v. Fine, 195 Misc. 464, 87 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), aff'd,
App. Div. 1043, 91 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dep't), leave to appeal denied, 276 App.
775, 93 N.Y.S.2d 298 (2d Dep't 1949). See generally Note, 16 St. John's L. Rev.
(1941).
19 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't), aff'd iaem., 254 N.Y.
173 N.E. 892 (1930); Note, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 245 (1931).
20 229 App. Div. 227, 229-30, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529, 531-32 (1st Dep't 1930).
21 Id. at 232, 241 N.Y. Supp. at 534.
22 Note, 16 St. John's L. Rev. 101, 103 (1941).
23 284 App. Div. 1049, 135 N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dep't 1954).
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taken April 15, 1954 revealed the drill and a complaint was served
August 17, 1954. The Appellate Division, relying on Conklin, granted
a motion to dismiss.
The Statute of Limitations commenced to run no later than the termination of the dentist-patient relationship between the parties on May 6,
1952, despite the fact that plaintiff did not know about the presence of
the foreign object which defendants allegedly permitted to remain in
plaintiff's mouth.2
Rokita v. Germaine25 involved a sponge left in the plaintiff on June 20,
1953, during the performance of a Caesarean section. A second operation
was performed to remove the sponge on July 6, 1953, but not until
October 5, 1956 did the plaintiff learn of the sponge. Her malpractice
action commenced April 10, 1957 was dismissed, the court citing Conklin
and holding that "the statute began to run from the date of the original
' 2
operation and not from the date of the discovery of the malpractice.
Finally, Dorfman v. Schoenfeld" concerned another errant sponge,
this time left in the plaintiff during the course of a 1952 4th-of-July
appendectomy. Plaintiff experienced some pain in April, 1957 but the
alleged malpractice was not discovered until January, 1958. An action
brought in July, 1958 was dismissed on the authority of Conklin.
I hold that the injury here actually occurred-insofar as this defendant's causative acts are concerned-when the operation was complete.
The damage was done then, and not when pain was first felt. Pain is
the result of the injury, not the injury itself.
The plaintiffs make a stirring appeal for a change of the New York
law in malpractice cases. It is undoubtedly within the competence of
the courts to make the change .... But, in the light of the very recent
appellate determinations . . , whether Special Term may properly take
28
the initiative is another matter..
Id. at 1049, 135 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
12 Misc. 2d 84, 176 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1958), aff'd, 8 App. Div.
2d 620, 185 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't 1959).
26 12 Misc. 2d 84, 87, 176 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1958).
27 26 Misc. 2d 37, 203 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), appeal dismissed 11 App.
Div. 2d 1024, 214 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1st Dep't 1960).
28 Id. at 38, 39, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 957. The Court of Appeals, while affirming Appellate
Division decisions holding that the malpractice statute begins to run from the date of
the negligent act or omission and not the discovery thereof, has always done so without
opinion. Golia v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 6 App. Div. 2d 884, 177 N.Y.S.2d
550 (2d Dep't 1958), aff'd mem., 7 N.Y.2d 931, 165 N.E.2d 578, 197 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1960);
Ranalli v. Breed, 251 App. Div. 750, 297 N.Y. Supp. 688 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd mem., 277
N.Y. 630, 14 N.E.2d 195 (1938); Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp.
529 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930). Compare Robins v.
Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955) and Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376,
165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960). Thus it has never categorically placed its seal
of approval on the above reasoning, although its answer in Conklin to a certified question
amounts to at least tacit acquiescence. 254 N.Y. at 621, 173 N.E. at 893. As the trial judge
in Dorfman v. Schoenfeld suggests, possibly the Appellate Division and certainly the Court
of Appeals may change the present construction of § 50(1).
24
25
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Judicial revision of New York's traditional view, however, would seem
to be wishful thinking, and law review writers have urged legislative
action for over twenty years.20 Uniformly, they have stressed the need
for a statute running from the discovery of the malpractice. 30 The Law
Revision Commission recommended such a statute in 1942, 31 as did the
Committee on Medical Jurisprudence of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York in 1958.32 The latter concluded:
[I] t is a denial of justice to deprive a patient injured through the
negligence of his doctor of any remedy where through excusable ignorance
he is unaware of the doctor's negligence until after the lapse of two
years. ....33
Nevertheless, such is the state of the law in New York today. Attempts
to circumvent the statute of limitations, which have met with limited
success, will be discussed below.
ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE NEw YORK RULE

Most reported malpractice cases in New York involve the statute of
limitations, and since the injury inflicted by the physician or surgeon
is often hidden and not readily discoverable, a large proportion are
held barred by New York's two year statute. 4 As might be expected,
29 "An amended statute, explicit in terms and leaving no room for doubt on any point,
would prevent further injustice. This section, perhaps more than any other, merits the
attention of the revisers of our Civil Practice Act." Note, 16 St. John's L. Rev. 101, 108
(1941).
30 Among the many writers taking such a position, see the following in New York:
Reich, supra note 15, at 198; Notes, 31 St. John's L. Rev. 123, 125 (1956); 1 Syracuse
L. Rev. 471, 479 (1950); 21 St. John's L. Rev. 77, 80 (1946); 16 St. John's L. Rev. 101,
107 (1941); 12 St. John's L. Rev. 330, 335-36 (1938). One writer in an insurance journal
has argued against statutory amendment. "Doctors now find the cost of their malpractice
insurance to be a serious financial burden. To suggest liberalization by drastic
modifications of the present statute of limitations and rules of liability in these cases
would effect no good purpose and would assist towards pricing this kind of insurance right
out of the market." Martin, "Comments on the Problem of Malpractice in New York
State," 22 Ins. Counsel J. 460, 464 (1955). Insofar as the writer's first sentence is
concerned, it appears to conflict with an American Medical Association survey indicating
that 56.4% of physicians consider their premiums for malpractice insurance "reasonable."
Comment, 164 JA.MA. 1583, 1584 (1957). His second sentence presents a valid but
not controlling policy consideration. Compare Note, 12 St. John's L. Rev. 330, 336
(1938): "Undoubtedly the physician, surgeon or dentist would not be as fully protected
[under a statute running from the discovery of the malpractice] as he is under the section
as it stands today, but in the current trend of opinion much of this protection is unwarranted and unjust." See also Committee on Medical Jurisprudence, supra note 11,

at 467.
31 Recommendations of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature, Leg. Doc.
No. 65(E) at 13-15, Report N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n at 141-43 (1942).
32 See Committee on Medical Jurisprudence, supra note 11, at 467-68.
33 Id. at 466.
34 "The number of adjudicated cases in which the question has arisen is no criterion as
to the number of instances in which such righi of action has been lost by the lapse of

time, for it is quite obvious that in view of the adjudications attorneys would advise their
clients that action would be fruitless." Id. at 465.
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plaintiffs frequently have sought ways of averting the rule's severity. 5
They have urged upon the courts, with varying degrees of success, the
adoption of a number of theories to circumvent the strict operation of
the statute. The three main lines of argument are (1) the continuous
treatment doctrine, (2) the action for breach of contract, and (3) the
action for fraud.
Continuous Treatment
The view that the statute of limitations runs from the date of the
malpractice and not the discovery thereof leaves open the question:
When did the malpractice occur? In many cases, such as a surgeon's
failure to remove the proverbial sponge, the facts can yield but one
answer. In other cases, however, the negligent physician continues to
treat the injured patient long after his initial negligent act. The commencement of the statutory period in such cases has sometimes been
postponed until the end of such treatment.
Sly v. Van Lengen, 6 the earliest case concerned with continuous treatment, saw the defendant physician close an opening during an abdominal
operation on November 30, 1918, without removing a gauze sponge.
The physician continued to treat the plaintiff up to September 28, 1921,
during which time the foreign substance remained in her pelvic cavity.
Plaintiff instituted suit on February 1, 1923, more than four years
after the operation, claiming that the time within which she could institute an action commenced to run from the termination of the physician's services in September, 1921. The court agreed with plaintiff's
contention,3 7 but it left the basis for its holding somewhat unclear.
If it should appear upon the trial that the injury from which plaintiff
is suffering was inflicted at the time of the operation and was not occasioned in any manner by the subsequent treatment of the plaintiff, nor
by any neglect on his part after the operation, a different situation would
arise.... It will be noted that the complaint alleges that the injuries
complained of were occasioned not only because defendant closed the
incision without removing the sponge from plaintiff's pelvic cavity, but
35 Indeed, the first reported case construing the present malpractice statute involved an
attempt to sidestep it. Hurlburt v. Gillett, 96 Misc. 585, 161 N.Y. Supp. 994 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1916), aff'd on opinion below, 176 App. Div. 893, 162 N.Y. Supp. 1124 (2d
Dep't 1916).
36 120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y. Supp. 608 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1923), Note 37 Harv.
L. Rev. 272 (1923).
37 The court expressly followed an Ohio sponge case, Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St.
106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902), where "it was held that the limitation did not begin to run
against plaintiff's right to maintain the action until the case had been abandoned by the
defendant, or the professional relationship terminated." Sly v. Van Lengen, supra note 36,
at 422, 198 N.Y. Supp. at 610. While it is conceivable that in a given case the termination
of the treatment and the termination of the professional relationship might not coincide,
no New York case with such a disparity seems to have arisen, at least in a statute of
limitations context. See Note, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 96, 97 (1935).
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also because defendant negligently allowed the foreign substance to
for upwards of two and a
remain in plaintiff's body from day to day
half years while he continued to treat her.3 8
While the court indicates that the statute would have run from the
date of the operation had not there been an allegation of negligent treat-

ment thereafter, it leaves in doubt the nature of the conduct required
to constitute negligent treatment. Phrases such as "neglect on his part

after the operation" and "allowed the foreign substance to remain"
demonstrate, in one writer's opinion, the court's belief "that there is a
continuous obligation upon the physician to remedy the negligent act, and

his daily breach of this duty is in itself malpractice. ' 39 This view is
supported by the court's observations that there was a "continuous breach
of duty on the part of the defendant . . . in failing to remove the

sponge ....

)40

The continuous treatment theory enunciated in the Sly case was not

available to the plaintiff in Conklin, since there the negligent physician
performed no postoperative services, 41 but the Appellate Division twice
suggests that the statute of limitations begins to run at the termination
of the treatment. 42 It may commence running, according to Nervick v.
Fine,43 a 1949 decision following Sly,
at the end of one operation, or at the end of a series of operations, or at
the end of the postoperative care. The malpractice might be malfeasance,
misfeasance or nonfeasance in the operation or in the aftercare.44 (Emphasis added.)

The Court of Appeals recently utilized the continuous treatment
38 Sly v. Van Lengen, supra note 36, at 422, 198 N.Y. Supp. at 610.

39 Note, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 245, 246 (1931). But see Anderson, "The Application of
Statutes of Limitation to Actions Against Physicians and Surgeons," 25 Ins. Counsel J.

237, 242 (1958).
40 Sly v. Van Lengen, supra note 36, at 422, 198 N.Y. Supp. at 610. See Louisell &
Williams, Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases 371 (1960). A contemporary notewriter
argued that "the physician should not be deemed to have been negligent after the operation
unless the ordinary diligent physician would have discovered the presence of the sponge."
Note, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 272, 273 (1923).
41 "The end of treatment exception, while adding a degree of leniency to the majority
rule, is unavailable in most cases because of the absence of the necessary factual
situation. ... The surgeon seldom has much to do with the post-operative treatment, and
yet most of the cases deal with foreign materials left in the body of a patient during an
operation. For this reason, the end of treatment exception does not eliminate the
objections to the majority rule, but merely lessens them in special situations.' Note,
"The Statute of Limitations in Actions for Undiscovered Malpractice, 12 Wyo. LJ.
30, 32 (1957).
42 229 App. Div. 227, 229, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529, 531-32 (1st Dep't 1930). See also the
memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals, 254 N.Y. 620, 621, 173 N.E. 892, 893
(1930).
43 195 Misc. 464, 87 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), aff'd 275 App. Div.
1043, 91 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dep't), leave to appeal denied, 276 App. Div. 775, 93
N.Y.S.2d 298 (2d Dep't 1949).
44 195 Misc. at 465, 87 N.Y.S.2d at 535.., Cf. Figuerca v. City of New York, 106
N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951); aff'd, 279 App. Div. 771, 109 N.Y.S.2d 126 (2d
Dep't 1951).
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Rosen,45

theory in Hammer v.
holding that a malpractice action based
upon a psychiatrist's beatings of a patient was not barred because the
beatings "were part and parcel of a continuing course of psychiatric
treatment which did not terminate until ... the very year in which the
action was begun. ' 46 The court, citing the above two cases as authority,
made no mention that the subsequent treatment need itself be negligent,
and a recent lower court decision construes the case as holding "that
the statute of limitations against malpractice starts to run when a course
of treatment ends without regard to whether there have been negligent
acts throughout the course of treatment." 47 Seemingly, the continuous
treatment must still be related to the original negligent act.
Under this approach, postoperative supervision of a patient's convalescence would toll the statute when a surgeon was sued for negligent
performance of an operation, but the fact that after the operation the
surgeon treated the patient for an entirely different malady would have
no such effect. Most lower court decisions apparently support this
view.4" Yet, some opinions do not spell out the requirement that the
continuing treatment be related, implying that any subsequent treatment may be sufficient. 49
Louisell and Williams, surveying the continuous treatment confusion
in New York and other states, contribute a helpful analysis of the
problem.
Where the injury results from a course of treatment and no specific act
can be isolated to account for the result, the date of the wrongful act is
considered to be that of the termination of the treatment. This modification of the time-of-wrongful act rule should be distinguished from the
rule followed in some jurisdictions that the statute runs from the termination 50of treatment without regard to the particular act causing the

injury.

7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
Id. at 380, 165 N.E.2d at 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
47 Borgia v. City of New York, - Misc. 2d -, -,
216 N.Y.S.2d 897, 903 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1961).
48 See Ferraro v. New York Univ., 13 Misc. 2d 131, 177 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1958); Matthews v. Pisani, 138 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1954);
Figuerca v. City of New York, supra note 44. Cf. Golia v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater
N.Y., 6 App. Div. 2d 884, 177 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2d Dep't 1958), aff'd mem., 7 N.Y.2d 931,
165 N.E.2d 578, 197 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1960). But see Numme v. Crescenzi, 144 N.Y.S.2d 145
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1955) (conclusory allegation of continued treatment in a
negligent manner disregarded and complaint dismissed). Cf. Steele v. City of New York,
12 Misc. 2d 605, 607, 177 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958) (notice to city
not timely and "no claim that the post-operative treatment was rendered in a negligent
manner").
49 Piedmont v. Society of New York Hosp., 25 Misc. 2d 41, 42, 204 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1960) (statute computed "from the date when the doctor
last treated the patient"). Cf. Budoff v. Kessler, 284 App. Div. 1049, 135 N.Y.S.2d 717
(2d Dep't 1954).
50 Louisell & Williams, supra note 40, at 369-70.
45
46
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New York courts make no attempt to justify their position on the ground
that it is impossible to isolate the specific wrongful act in the course of
continuous treatment. Since nonnegligent and perhaps even unrelated
subsequent treatment apparently tolls the statute, New York has gone
far beyond a modification of the traditional view that the cause of
action accrues when the wrongful act is committed. Manifestly, this
approach is an attempt to circumvent the sometimes harsh application
of New York's rigid statute. It has been successful in this objective
where continuous treatment in fact took place.
Contract Action
The physician-patient relationship being a contractual one, a physician's negligence may constitute a breach of contract. 1 Early attempts
to frame a cause of action in contract, and thereby take advantage of
a longer limitation period,5 2 proved futile. 53 Courts quickly pierced
pleadings framed in contract terms and applied the malpractice statute.5 4
Allegations of pain and suffering and requests for unliquidated damages
were treated as sure indicia that the action was one for malpractice.5 5
In Horowitz v. Bogart,5" where a physician agreed to remove an ulcer
from the plaintiff's body but instead removed his appendix, the latter
attempted to evade the malpractice statute by omitting allegations of
"lack of skill" or "negligence" and including a reference to "improper
performance of the work to the personal injury of the plaintiff." He
was unsuccessful.
The nature of the charge of malpractice is not changed by failing to
sufficiently state it in necessary detail, or by putting it in language suitable to the statement of a cause of action on contract, omitting the usual
allegations as to absence of skill and negligence.57
Scarcely had the above been established, however, before the courts
began delimiting an area where a contract action was permissible. Dismissing the complaint in Monahan v. Devinny58 on the ground that it
was barred by the malpractice statute of limitations, the court openly
recommended that the plaintiff sue in contract to obtain partial relief.
51 See generally Miller, "The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons," 1953
Wash. U.L.Q. 413.
52 The contract statute of limitations is six years, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 48(1), in
contrast to the two year malpractice period. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 50(1).
53 Burrell v. Preston, 54 Hun 70, 7 N.Y. Supp. 177 (Sup. Ct. Livingston County 1889).
54 Hurlburt v. Gillett, 96 Misc. 585, 161 N.Y. Supp. 994 (Sup. Ct. Kings County),
aff'd on opinion below, 176 App. Div. 893, 162 N.Y. Supp. 1124 (2d Dep't 1916).
55 See text accompanying notes 80-84 infra.
56 218 App. Div. 158, 217 N.Y. Supp. 881 (1st Dep't 1926).
57 Id. at 160, 217 N.Y. Supp. at 882.
58 223 App. Div. 547, 229 N.Y. Supp. 60 (3d Dep't 1928).
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Conklin v. Draper, the leading case barring a malpractice
involved a cause of action in contract which withstood the
motion to dismiss. Other cases followed suit.6 0 The damages
in each instance differed sharply from those recoverable in
actions, for reasons explained in Colvin v. Smith:61
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action, also
defendant's
recoverable
malpractice

The damages recoverable in malpractice are for personal injuries, including the pain and suffering which naturally flow from the tortious act. In
the contract action, they are restricted to the payments made and to the
expenditure for nurses and medicines or other damages that flow from
the breach thereof. 62
The contract action, which one notewriter has characterized as "an
entirely unsatisfactory remedy affording plaintiff only partial relief,"63
is not always available to the plaintiff. Where the common-law duty to
use due care and the contractual duty are essentially the same, a physician's negligence is actionable only by a malpractice suit.64 Thus in Hert3
gen v. Weintraub,"
where a physician left a needle in a patient's body
after delivering her of child, the court held that "at the most the wrong
complained of is tortious and nothing else," 6 since the physician had
promised only to use due care in delivering the child and this sole
promised result had been accomplished. The court quoted the following
excerpt from Carr v. Lipshie,67 which demonstrates why a contract
remedy is unavailable in a large number of malpractice cases.
Actions for breach of contract have been sustained where a specific result
is guaranteed by the terms of the agreement, but not where the contracting party either expressly or impliedly promises to perform services of
the standard generally followed in the profession or promises to use due
care in the performance of the services to be rendered. The pleading
59 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 254 N.Y. 620, 173
N.E. 92 (1930); Note; 15 Minn. L. Rev. 245 (1931).
60 Hirsch v. Safian, 257 App. Div. 212, 12 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1st Dep't 1939); Keating v.
Perkins, 250 App. Div. 9, 293 N.Y. Supp. 197 (1st Dep't 1937); Note, 5 U. Chi. L. Rev.
156 (1937) ; Frank v. Maliniak, 232 App. Div. 278, 249 N.Y. Supp. 514 (1st Dep't 1931).
61 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d Dep't 1949).
62 Id. at 9-10, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 795. See Miller, supra note 51, at 428.
63 Note, 16 St. John's L. Rev. 101, 104 (1941).
64 Horowitz v. Bogart, 218 App. Div. 158, 217 N.Y. Supp. 881 (1st Dep't 1926);
Hurlburt v. Gillett, supra note 54; Burrell v. Preston, 54 Hun 70, 7 N.Y. Supp. 177 (Sup.
Ct. Livingston County 1889). Cf. Gautieri v. New Rochelle Hosp. Ass'n, 4 App. Div. 2d
874, 166 N.Y.S.2d 934 (2d Dep't 1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 952, 157 N.E.2d 172, 183 N.Y.S.2d
803 (1959). Where plaintiff's malpractice action is held barred by the two year statute,
leave to serve an amended complaint alleging a breach of contract will be granted. Matter
of Robillard's Will, 136 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951). Compare Budoff v.
Kessler, 284 App. Div. 1049, 135 N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dep't 1954), with Budoff v. Kessler,
2 App. Div. 2d 760, 153 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1956). See also Miller, supra note 51, at
433-34.
65 29 Misc. 2d 396, 215 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961).
66 Id. at 398, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 381. The court gave the same characterization to a second
cause of action based upon breach of warranty. Id at 398, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
67 8 App. Div. 2d 330, 187 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Ist Dep't 1959) (analogous case involving a
firm of accountants).
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herein does not allege a promise to accomplish a definite result ....
It
merely states that the defendants would perform the services with due
with the recognized and accepted practices of
care and in accordance
68
the profession.
A contract action is maintainable, however, when a physician expressly
engages to do something in excess of his common-law duty. A frequent
illustration of this involves a special agreement by the physician either
to cure the patient or to achieve a particular result. Breach of such an
agreement gives rise to contractual liability. 9 Robins v. Finestone,7 0
where the plaintiff employed a surgeon to remove a growth, is an excellent example of the type of case where a contract action is allowed.
There the surgeon allegedly promised the plaintiff that he would be
cured in one or two days; instead he was hospitalized for a month.
The Court of Appeals, upholding his contract action, stated:
[A] doctor and his patient are at liberty to contract for a particular
result and, if that result be not attained, a cause of action for breach of
for malpractice alcontract results which is entirely separate from one
71
though both may arise from the same transaction.
Closely allied to the special contract to cure is the agreement to use a
particular method to achieve the desired result. If a method other than
that agreed upon is employed and the patient is injured, he may sue for
breach of contract. In Frank v. Maliniak7 a plastic surgeon agreed to
treat the plaintiff's condition by internal surgery without making external incisions. When such incisions were made, the surgeon was held
liable for breach of contract. Robins v. Finestone,7 3 where a contract
action was sustained, involved a similar situation.
Finally, a contract recovery has been permitted in New York where
the physician has agreed to perform an operation but fails to do so to
the injury of the patient. While improper performance of an operation
generally gives rise only to a malpractice action,"4 failure to perform the
correct operation will permit an action for breach of contract. 7 5
68 Id. at 332, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
69 Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d Dep't 1949); Hirsch v.
Safian, 257 App. Div. 212, 12 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1st Dep't 1939); Frankel v. Wolper, 181 App.

Div. 485, 169 N.Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dep't 1918), aff'd, 228 N.Y. 582, 127 N.E. 913 (1920).
70 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955); Note, 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 165; Note, 2 N.Y.L.F.
121 (1956); Note, 131 St. John's L. Rev. 123 (1956).
71 Id. at 546, 127 N.E.2d at 331-32.
72 232 App. Div. 278, 249 N.Y. Supp. 514 (1st Dep't 1931).
73 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).

74 Ranalli v. Breed, 251 App. Div. 750, 297 N.Y. Supp. 688 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd, 277
N.Y. 630, 14 N.E.2d 195 (1938).
"5 Keating v. Perkins, 250 App. Div. 9, 293 N.Y. Supp. 197 (1st Dep't 1937) ; McAlpin v.

Browne, 15 Misc. 2d 255, 181 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958); Calabrese v.
Bickley, 208 Misc. 407, 143 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955), modified, 1 App.
Div. 2d 874, 150 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1st Dep't 1956). But see Horowitz v. Bogart, supra note
56, and text accompanying notes 56 & 57 supra.
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In every case where contract relief is sought, the court will scrutinize
the allegations contained in the complaint to ascertain whether the
gravamen of the action is indeed contract. The fact that negligence or
unskilled treatment are not alleged is not conclusive. The action may
still be regarded as one in malpractice despite the absence of such allegations. 78 Likewise, the presence of such allegations indicates that the
action is in tort,7 . but this inference is not mandatory." As the Court
of Appeals noted in Robins v. Finestone:
The fact that the plaintiff alleges that the defendant performed his part
of the contract in an "unworkmanlike" and "unskillful" manner does not
serve to label the complaint as one stating a cause of action in malpractice only, since it is frequent in breach of contract actions involving the
rendition of services for plaintiff to allege that the services were unworkmanlike and unskillful. 79
The statement of damages alleged is considered much more seriously.
The absence of a claim for damages for pain and suffering is a strong
indicia that the action is one in contract.8 0 Thus, the Court of Appeals,
allowing a contract action, observed:
Nowhere in the complaint is there any statement that the plaintiff seeks
to recover for his pain and suffering, which would be a relevant and
material allegation if it were an action in malpractice. The damages
sought are those suited to an action on contract, and help to characterize
the complaint as one based upon a contract and not based upon malpractice and negligence. 8 '
The presence of such a claim almost always results in a characterization
of the suit as one for malpractice."2 The same result occurs when the
plaintiff demands unliquldated damages.8 8 Such a demand
76 Horowitz v. Bogart, supra note 56.
77 Monahan v. Devinny, 223 App. Div. 547, 229 N.Y. Supp. 60 (3d Dep't 1928).
78 Cf. Archibald v. Hill Sanatorium, 121 Misc. 193, 201 N.Y. Supp 86 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1923).
79 308 N.Y. 543, 547, 127 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1955).
80 Budoff v. Kessler, 2 App. Div. 2d 760, 153 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1956); Conklin v.
Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'd mem., 254 N.Y. 620,
173 N.E. 892 (1930).
81 Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 547, 127 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1955). The court's
emphasis upon the absence of a request for damages for pain and suffering should not be
read to mean that this omission is conclusive evidence of a contract action. Note, 7
Syracuse L. Rev. 165, 166 (1955). "Although this is a test to determine whether the action
is ex contractu rather than ex delicto," Hertgen v. Weintraub, 29 Misc. 2d 396, 397, 215
N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961), it is not the sole test, and in any event
the plaintiff still must establish a special agreement in order to recover in contract. Ibid.
See also Note, 31 St. John's L. Rev. 123, 125 n.15 (1956).
82 Horowitz v. Bogart, 218 App. Div. 158, 217 N.Y. Supp. 881 (1st Dep't 1926);
Frankel v. Wolper, 181 App. Div. 485, 169 N.Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dep't 1918), aff'd, 228 N.Y.
582, 127 N.E. 913 (1920); Hurlburt v. Gillett, 96 Misc. 585, 161 N.Y. Supp. 994 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1916), aff'd on opinion below, 176 App. Div. 893, 162 N.Y. Supp. 1124
(2d Dep't 1916).
83 Ibid.

1962]
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is not suited to an action for breach of contract. Damages that are recoverable for a breach are sums paid to the defendant, expenditures necessitated for nurses and medicines, and those other damages which naturally
flow fom the breach of the contract ....84

Thus, while the contract remedy may be available to an injured patient
in certain situations,8 5 it affords an inadequate recovery even in these

instances. 6 Patently, it represents a modest attempt by the courts to
ameliorate the hardships caused by their strict application of the mal87
practice statute of limitations.

Permitting a contract action has several drawbacks from a physician's
standpoint in addition to lengthening his period of potential liability.
If a physician makes a special contract and then fails to perform, "he
is liable for breach of contract even though he use the highest possible
professional skill." 8 The plaintiff's burden of proof is therefore much
lighter,89 since he is not required to prove negligence by means of expert
medical testimony, 0 the physician being liable regardless of the degree
of care exercised by him. 1 Furthermore, there is the possibility that a
physician held liable in contract may not be able to secure indemnifica84 Hertgen v. Weintraub, 29 Misc. 2d 396, 398, 215 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1961). Other cases discussing the damages recoverable in contract actions include
Keating v. Perkins, 250 App. Div. 9, 293 N.Y. Supp. 197 (1st Dep't 1937); Conklin v.
Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 254 N.Y.
620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930); and Monahan v. Devinny, 223 App. Div. 547, 229 N.Y. Supp.
60 (3d Dep't 1928).
85 See text accompanying notes 63-75 supra.
86 "The usual contract measure of damages may be suitable for the settlement of rights
under normal commercial transactions, but it does not compensate for the disappointment,
pain, and suffering resulting from a failure to cure as promised." Note, 7 Syracuse L. Rev.

165 (1955).

87 Of the Robins decision one notewriter observed: "This characterization of the
complaint [as one in contract] would seem to indicate the Court's awareness of the
questionable justice of the time limitation on malpractice actions and its willingness to
avoid the harsh result of the application of such a bar to plaintiff's action." Note, 31
St. John's L. Rev. 123, 125 (1956). Compare Miller, supra note 51, at 430.
88 Safian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, 768, 24 N.Y.S.2d 92, 95 (1st Dep't
1940), aff'd, 286 N.Y. 649, 36 N.E.2d 692 (1941); Note, 10 Brooklyn L. Rev. 411. See also
Miller, supra note 51, at 417.
89 It has been advanced that "a judge and jury often feel that no matter what the
doctor says, the patient is to be believed when he or she testifies that the doctor promised
a perfect end result." Martin, supra note 30, at 461. The validity of this statement is
doubtful. Most reported contract actions in New York arise on motion. In the only
reported trial court opinion following the sustaining of a contract complaint on appeal,
decided one year after Martin's article, the trial court held that the alleged contract was
not proved and dismissed the complaint. Robins v. Feinstone, 155 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1956). The plaintiff's burden of proof is lighter, but not because he
finds it easier to establish a special agreement. See note 90 infra.
190 The medical profession is well aware that'a contract action "enables the plaintiff
to dispense with the necessity of obtaining expert medical testimony in proving his case."
Sandor, "The History of Professional Liability Suits in the United States," 163 JA.M.A.
459, 466 (1957).
91 Keating v. Perkins, 250 App. Div. 9, 293 N.Y. Supp. 197 (1st Dep't 1937). "Strained
construction of a contract in the instant case supplants proof of negligence in a situation
traditionally considered tort. Thus absolute liability is imposed, for the defense by proof

of due care is precluded. . .

."

Note, 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 156, 157 (1937).
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tion from his insurance company under a policy insuring him against

malpractice, error, or mistake.9" In the past, many policies have contained provisions expressly disclaiming liability for claims on account
93
of any special contract, guarantee, or warranty.

FraudAction
The contract remedy sometimes provides a limited amount of relief
in cases where the patient does not become aware of his injury within
the two year malpractice period. Similar attempts to frame an action in

fraud, in order to take advantage of the six year fraud statute which

94
runs from the time of the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud,

have been unsuccessful.9 5 The courts have held repeatedly that, where
the injury is caused by the negligence of a physician, his subsequent

concealment, even if intentional, is at most an aggravation of the injury
and does not support a separate action for fraud 96 or deceitY7 The
physician's failure to disclose his negligent act is a breach of his pro-

fessional duty, but a breach which only constitutes malpractice."
The first attempt to circumvent the malpractice statute via the fraud
approach occurred in Tullock v. Haselo,9 9 where during an extraction a
dentist allegedly allowed a tooth to fall down plaintiff's throat into her
lung. He concealed his act of malpractice from the plaintiff, 10 0 who
92 Saflan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, 24 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1st Dep't 1940),
aff'd, 286 N.Y. 649, 36 N.E.2d 692 (1941). Cf. Strauss v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 30
Misc. 2d 345, - N.Y.S.2d - (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1961).
93 Note, 10 Brooklyn L. Rev. 411, 413 (1941).
94 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 48(5).
95 Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960) (dismissal
of fraud count affirmed).
196Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N.Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dep't 1926).
97 Calabrese v. Bickley, 208 Misc. 407, 143 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955),
modified, 1 App. Div. 2d 874, 150 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1st Dep't 1956). But see McAIpin v.
Browne, 15 Misc. 2d 255, 181 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), where the
court speaks of "deceit" while apparently sustaining a contract action.
98 Kleinman v. Lack, 6 App. Div. 2d 1046, 179 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1958). Cf.
Golia v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 6 App. Div. 2d 884, 177 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2d
Dep't 1958), aff'd mem., 7 N.Y.2d 931, 165 N.E.2d 578, 197 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1960).
99 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N.Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dep't 1926).
100 The court stressed the absence of an allegation that the dentist knew that the tooth
had lodged in plaintiff's lung. He might have assumed, the court reasoned, that the tooth
had entered her stomach and passed through her system. "There is nothing alleged from
which we may infer any intentional fraudulent misrepresentation of fact as to the presence
of a tooth in the lung resulting from letting it fall down her throat." Tulloch v. Haselo,
supra note 99, at 315, 218 N.Y. Supp. at 141. The distinction, based upon whether the dentist
knew for certain that his negligent act would cause damage, seems unwarranted. "Thus did
the court advise the negligent dentist of the reward for silence and the continued breach of
duty in not informing the plaintiff of the possible disastrous effect of the treatment."
Reich, supra note 15, at 191. The possibility of a fraud action when the physician knows
that his negligent act will cause damage and yet conceals the same is unlikely in view of
Calabrese v. Bickley, 208 Misc. 407, 143 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955), modified, 1 App. Div. 2d 874, 150 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1st Dep't 1956). Cf. Conklin v. Draper, 229
App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892
(1930) (physician's knowledge that he left forceps in plaintiff's abdomen and his concealment thereof held not to toll malpractice statute of limitations).
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discovered it nearly three years after her last treatment by the dentist."0 '
The court brushed aside plaintiff's contention that her complaint stated
a cause of action for fraud.
The concealment alleged is not the wrong which must be made the
gravamen of an "action to procure a judgment on the ground of fraud"
within Civil Practice Act, section 48. .

.

. It was malpractice that was

the proximate cause of the injury which the plaintiff sustained. The
failure to speak and to disclose
0 2 his negligent act was a breach of duty
which constituted malpractice.'
More recently, in a fraud action brought against a physician who had
informed a patient that he had successfully removed her gall bladder,
when in fact he had failed to do so, the court reiterated this view.
As malpractice covers every way in which a patient is injured through the
dereliction of a doctor in his professional capacity, the approach, depending on the facts, can be through any of several familiar forms of
action. But no matter what the approach, it remains an action for malpractice, not one for deceit, contract or anything else. A well-recognized ground for recovery is where a physician represents that he has the
skill to perform a certain operation when in fact he does not. This form
of action requires the same elements of proof that an action in fraud
requires, yet it could not be successfully disputed that as between the two
it is an action for malpractice. Where, as here, the fraud consists in concealing the malpractice, it has been held that the gravamen is the malpractice and the concealment merely an item in [the] chain of circumstances causing the damage ....0 3

In much the same way that a fraudulent concealment of malpractice
does not give rise to an independent fraud action, neither does it toll
the malpractice statute of limitations.' 4 Similarly, the courts have
rejected the argument that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be
invoked in concealment cases.' 0 5 An attempt to frame a conspiracy
action also has met with failure. 0 6
RELATED STATUTES

Section 50-d of the General Municipal Law, enacted in 1937, provided
that municipal corporations should assume liability for the malpractice
101 Thereby precluding use of the continuous treatment theory. Quaere: would not a
contract action now be feasible? See Keating v. Perkins, 250 App. Div. 9, 293 N.Y. Supp.
197 (1st Dep't 1937).
102 Tulloch v. Haselo, supra note 99, at 316-17, 218 N.Y. Supp. at 142.
103 Calabrese v. Bickley, 208 Misc. 407, 408-09, 143 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1955), modified, 1 App. Div. 2d 874, 150 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1st Dep't 1956).
104 "Alleged fraud in concealing the injury does not preclude pleading the statute of
limitations .... " Kleinman v. Lack, 6 App. Div. 2d 1046, 179 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't
1958). See text at note 21 supra. See generally Dawson, "Fraudulent Concealment and
Statutes of Limitation," 31 Mich. L. Rev. 875, 904-06 (1933).
105 "It would be a dangerous precedent to establish to hold that equity should interpose against the Statute of Limitations in a malpractice case. . . ." Tulloch v. Haselo,
supra note 99, at 317, 218 N.Y. Supp. at 143.
106 Numme v. Crescenzi, 144 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1955).
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of physicians or dentists rendering services gratuitously to persons in
public institutions maintained in whole or in part by municipal corporations.' 0 7 As Judge (then Justice) Van Voorhis observed, the "object
of this statute was evidently to encourage physicians and dentists to
donate their services rendered to patients in public institutions by indemnifying them against claims for malpractice."' 0 8 Under the section
an "action may be instituted against either the doctor or the city or

both.

.... M09

While the section has been substantially broadened in scope during
the past twenty-five years,"10 the most important problem from the
limitation-of-actions viewpoint has escaped legislative revision. The
right of action granted by section 50-d has always been conditioned
upon a prompt notification of claim and commencement of suit. The
section, vouching in section 50-e, provides that notice of claim must be
given within ninety days after the claim arises. Similarly, section 504
now prescribes a period of one year and ninety days within which an
action against a municipality must be commenced. Hence, in cases
where an injured patient seeks to hold the municipality liable, he is subject to extremely rigorous time limitations which often prevent any
chance of relief."'
The use of stringent notice and suit requirements where potential

municipal liability is concerned is common. What is unusual, and extremely hard on plaintiffs, is that the courts have also applied these
107 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 483, § 1; as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 694, § 3;
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1950, ch. 681, § 1; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, ch. 514, § 1; N.Y. Sess. Laws
1956, ch. 897, § 1. Repealed and re-enacted by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 188, § 1.
108 Schmid v. Werner, 277 App. Div. 520, 524, 100 N.Y.S.2d 860, 864 (1st Dep't 1950),
aff'd, 303 N.Y. 754, 103 N.E.2d 540 (1952).
109 Matter of Polk v. City of New York, 188 Misc. 727, 71 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947). Actions against physician: Derlicka v. Leo, 281 N.Y. 266,
22 N.E.2d 367 (1939), 10 Brooklyn L. Rev. 213 (1940); Martinez v. Modica, 191 Misc.
836, 80 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948); Barnes v. Gardner, 170 Misc. 604,
9 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1939). Actions against municipality: Schmid v.
Werner, supra note 108; Steele v. City of New York, 12 Misc. 2d 605, 177 N.Y.S.2d 816
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958). Actions against both: Mackrell v. City of New York, 183
Misc. 1036, 52 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1944). A notewriter, commenting
upon Schmid v. Werner, supra, noted that "the appellate division held that the statute did
not subject the city to such a direct action ... ." Note, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 871, 890 (1961).
But in the case the Appellate Division stated: "In cases where the services have been
rendered gratuitously by the physician or dentist, it appears to have been the intention
of section 50-d to enable the patient to sue the city directly, thus avoiding the circuity
of action involved in suing the doctor first and then permitting him to recover over against
the municipality." Schmid v. Werner, supra note 108, at 524-25, 100 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
While the city was not held liable, it was because the physician had not given his services
gratuitously to the hospital, thereby taking the city out of Section 50-d as it then stood,
rather than because the section forbids a direct action.
11o See text accompanying notes 118-23 infra.
1l See, e.g., Steele v. City of New York, 12 Misc. 2d 605, 177 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1958). But see Borgia v. City of New York, - Misc. 2d -, 216 N.Y.S.2d
897 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961).
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requirements to actions brought against physicians covered by section 50-d. 11 The Court of Appeals in Derlicka v. Leo," 3 impliedly overruling a lower court decision holding that the malpractice statute of
limitations applied to actions wherein a municipality was not made a
defendant, 11 4 took the position that section 50-d cuts the two-year malpractice statute down to municipal size even when the physician is the
sole defendant. In a per curiam opinion the court stated:
Section 50-d creates a new remedy against the city in favor of the injured
person. The liability which existed at common law may still be enforced by
action against the physician, but the physician would have a right to insist
that in accordance with the staute he be saved harmless by the municipal
corporation. The effect of any action, whether brought against the municipality or against the physician or dentist, is determined by the provisions of the statute and, by the express terms of the statute, may be
maintained only if "the applicable provisions of law pertaining to the
commencement of action and filing of notice ...against such municipal
corporation shall be strictly complied with."115
Where the patient cannot satisfy the rigid requirements of section 50-d,
50-e and 50-i, then, he not only finds himself precluded from holding the
municipality liable," 6 but he is barred from suing the very physician
whose malpractice is the basis of his action. As one commentator observed: "The court insists that the common law right of action against
the doctor has not been abrogated, but the Statute of Limitations on such
7
an action has been sliced in half.""
Amendments to the section have broadened its protective coverage,
simultaneously increasing the situations where the short notice and
action requirements apply to actions against individual- physicians. As
it was first enacted, section 50-d applied only where a physician or
dentist rendered services "gratuitously." As the court stated in Schmid
v. Werner:" 8
112 See, e.g., Matter of Griffin v. Cumberland Hosp., 20 Misc. 2d 639, 640, 194 N.Y.S.2d
82, 83 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959).
113 281 N.Y. 266, 22 NXE.2d 367 (1939).
114 [I]n whittling down the immunity the Legislature prescribed certain conditions
as to limitation of time and notice such as are customary when municipalities are
sued. There is nowhere manifested any attempt to interfere with, modify or repeal
other general Statutes of Limitation in suits against individuals. Section 50-d . . .
specifically refers to an action brought "under this section." The action is not brought
under that section.
Barnes v. Gardner, 170 Misc. 604, 606, 9 N.Y.S.2d 785, 787 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1939).
115 Derlicka v. Leo, supra note 113, at 268-69, 22 N.E.2d at 368.
116 Plaintiffs who have satisfied the notice requirement in direct actions against the
municipality have been met with the extreme argument that their actions were barred
bemuse they had failed to serve the physician with a notice of claim. Such service is unnecessary. Matter of Polk v. City of New York, supra note 109. Thus, while a notice
of claim must be filed upon the municipality before commencement of an action either
against it or the physician, where the action is against the municipality alone no notice
need be served upon the physician.
117 Note, 10 Brooklyn L. Rev. 213, 216 (1940).
118 277 App. Div. 520, 524, 100 N.Y.S.2d 860, 864 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 754,
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If the doctor is paid or to be paid by the city, then, regardless of whether
the patient reimburses the municipality, he may sue the doctor untrammeled by section 50-d of the General Municipal Law....
Of course, in such cases the patient could not maintain an action against

the municipality.
In 1956, section 50-d was amended to reverse the result of the above
case and to impose liability upon a municipality for the negligence "of
any resident physician, physician, interne, dentist or podiatrist rendering medical, dental or podiatry services of any kind to a person without
receiving compensation from such person. .. 211" The purpose of the
amendment, sponsored by the Medical Society of the State of New York,
was to extend section 50-d coverage to internes and resident physicians
who receive only a nominal honorarium for their services and find it
hard to procure malpractice insurance. 2 0 Obviously, this purpose differs
from the intent underlying the original section, which was to encourage
and the
physicians to donate their services to municipal hospitals,'
amendment was opposed by the New York State Bar Association' 2 and
the State Comptroller 23 for this reason.
Whether one agrees with the amendment or not, its effect is to widen
the area where direct actions may be brought against a municipality and,
concomitantly, to permit a larger class of medical personnel to avail
themselves of the short municipal notice and limitation periods in actions
brought directly against them. In short, where a patient is injured by a
paid or unpaid physician, interne, dentist, or podiatrist working in a
103 N.E.2d 540 (1952). See also Martinez v. Modica, 191 Misc. 836, 80 N.Y.S.2d 132
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948) and Mackrell v. City of New York, 183 Misc. 1036, 52
N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1944).
"19 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, ch. 897, § 1 (emphasis added). Podiatrists had been added
by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, ch. 514, § 1.
120 Letter from Dr. Harold B. Smith, Executive Officer, Medical Society of the State
of New York, to Hon. Daniel Gutman, Counsel to the Governor, March 21, 1956.
121 See text accompanying note 108 supra.
122 The bill represents a change in purpose from that of encouraging the performance
of gratuitous services in public institutions by eminent physicians and dentists to that
of increasing the liability of municipalities. There seems no more reason now to
protect resident physicians, internes and dentists, gainfully employed in a municipal
hospital, against liability for their own negligence at the expense of municipal taxpayers than there was when section 50-d was originally enacted.
Report, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on State Legislation No. 105 (1956).
123 The bill appears to extend the coverage of section 50-d far beyond what was
intended by the original enactment. In the first place, it fails to define a "resident
physician" leaving that term open to the possible inclusion of all physicians other than
internes on the payroll of the institution. Furthermore, the bill would include within
the coverage of the statute "any other physician" rendering services without receiving
compensation from the patient. This could be construed to mean any physician on
the staff of the hospital, including those receiving relatively large salaries and those
whose experience has been sufficiently long and reputations sufficiently good to enable
them to receive insurance coverage.
Letter From Hon. Arthur Levitt, State Comptroller, to Hon. Averell Harriman, Governor,
April 10, 1956.
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municipal institution, he must satisfy these requirements unless he has
directly compensated the medical man involved. Only then, in the one
instance when he may not maintain an action against the municipality,
is he still subject to the malpractice statute of limitations when suing
the negligent individual.
JURISPRUDENCE OF OTHER STATES

24

Only sixteen states, other than New York, have statutes of limitation
specifically applicable to malpractice actions. 2 5 These provisions commonly refer to actions for "malpractice, error or mistake,' 126 although
some add actions for "failure to cure" to this listing.'2 7 Two-thirds of
the states have no specific limitation period. Of these, most classify
actions for malpractice as personal injury actions and apply this statute
to them.' 28 The remainder either place malpractice actions under provisions relating to actions for which no other limitation period is enumerated'2 9 or under one of a number of miscellaneous provisions.,30 The
time periods in which to commence malpractice actions vary from one
to six years.' 3' More than one-half the states have two year statutes. 13 2
Computation of Time
Wide variations exist among the states on several highly important
matters aside from the type and length of the applicable statute. The
first and most important variation concerns when the statute starts
running. About one-half of the statutes, both those expressly applicable
and those construed as applicable to malpractice actions, provide that
124 Capsule summaries of the law of the other forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia are found in Louisell & Williams, supra note 40, at 363-415.
125 See the Appendices for the text of these statutes, together with citations to the
applicable statutes of other states. Specific statutory citations will not be given in the
footnotes that follow. Reference should be-made to the Appendices if a citation is desired.
126 See the statutes of Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri and

South Dakota.

127 See the statutes of the states listed at note 126 supra, with the exception of Massachusetts and Missouri.
128 Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia (doubtful), Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
129 District of Columbia, Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, Utah and Virginia
(doubtful).
130 Kansas (injury to rights of another not arising on contract or otherwise provided
for), Louisiana (offenses or quasi-offenses), Maryland (actions on the case), Montana
(non-contractual obligation or liability not founded on an instrument in writing), Oklahoma (same as Kansas, supra) and Wyoming (same as Kansas, supra).
181 One year: California, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ohio, Tennessee and Virginia. Three
years: District of Columbia, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. Four years: Florida, Utah and Wyoming.
132 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia.
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the action must be commenced within the given number of years after
the cause of action accrues. 133 Many statutes simply state that the
action must be commenced within so many years, giving no guidance at
all as to the time from which the period is to be computed. 34 A few
states have statutes which specify that the cause of action accrues or the
statute begins to run from the date of the act or omission constituting
the negligence,' 35 the date when the injury was sustained, 136 or the date
when the injury was or should reasonably have been discovered. 137
Of those states having statutes which do not define the time of accrual,
all but four which have passed upon the question have taken the position that the cause of action accrues, i.e. the statute begins to run, at
the time of the wrongful act which constitutes the alleged malpractice
and not when the injury is manifested or discovered.' 38 The rationale
behind this' view was well stated by the Supreme Judicial Court of
39
Massachusetts in the leading case of Cappuci v. Barone:1
Any act of misconduct or negligence on his [the physician's] part in the
service undertaken... gave rise to a right of action... and the statutory
period began to run at that time, and not when the actual damage results or is ascertained, as the plaintiff contends. The damage sustained
by the wrong done is not the cause of action; and the statute is a bar to
the original cause of action although the damages may be nominal, and
to all the consequential damages resulting from it though such damages
may be substantial and not foreseen.
Louisiana and New
On the other hand, California, 140 Florida,'
133 Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia.
134 Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
135 Arkansas and Indiana.
136 Delaware and Pennsylvania.
137 Alabama and Connecticut.
138 Summers v. Wallace Hosp., 276 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1960); Tessier v. United States,
269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959); Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133, 174 S.E.
365 (1934); Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Ill. App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795 (1943); Ogg v.
Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917); Waddell v. Woods, 160 Kan. 481, 163 P.2d
348 (1945); Carter v. Harlan Hosp. Ass'n, 265 Ky. 452, 97 S.W.2d 9 (1936); Hahn
v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 AtI. 83 (1917); Wilder v. St. Joseph Hosp., 225 Miss. 42,
82 So. 2d 651 (1955); Coady v. Reins, 1 Mont. 424 (1872); Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510,
73 S.E.2d 320 (1952) ; DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952) ; Shives
v. Chamberlain, 168 Ore. 676, 126 P.2d 28 (1942) ; Hinkle v. Hargens, 76 S.D. 520, 81 N.W.2d
888 (1957); Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S.W.2d 140 (1934); Carrell v. Denton,
138 Tex. 145, 157 S.W.2d 878 (1942); Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932);
Murray v. Allen, 103 Vt. 373, 154 Adt. 678 (1931); Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675,
277 P.2d 724 (1954); Gray v. Wright, 142 W. Va. 490, 96 S.E.2d 671 (1957); Lotten v.
O'Brien, 146 Wis. 258, 131 N.W. 361 (1911).
139 266 Mass. 578, 581, 165 N.E. 653, 654-55 (1919).
140 Stafford v. Schultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 270 P.2d 1 (1954); Tell v. Taylor, 12 Cal. Rptr.
648 (Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1961); Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d
445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953).
141 City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
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Jersey, 142 under substantially similar statutes, have espoused the so-called
minority rule that the statute of limitations does not begin running until
the patient discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should
have discovered the injury. This approach is, of course, an effort to
avoid some of the potentially harsh consequences of the majority accrual
rule especially where the malpractice is not easily discoverable. As described by a dissenting justice in Washington, a state following the
majority rule, it is based essentially on considerations of justice:
Until the discovery of the sponge in her body ... the plaintiff did not
know, and apparently the defendant doctor did not know, that the patient
had any basis for a cause of action.... To say that the patient had a
cause of action all the while, although no one knew about it or suspected
it, may meet some tests of legal logic or theory; but the result would
hardly meet the tests of abstract, generally applicable, or lay standards
of justice. 143
The same result that has been reached in the above four states
by judicial construction has been achieved in Alabama, Connecticut,
and Missouri by legislative enactment. The Missouri statute requires
that the action "be brought within two years from the date of the act
of neglect complained of . . .

,"

but another, general statute tolls

its running until the damage is "sustained and is capable of ascertainment....",4 A plaintiff in Alabama has two years from the negligent
act or omission in which to sue but, if the cause of action is not reasonably discoverable within that period, he then is given six months from
the date of discovery of the cause of action or of facts which would
reasonably lead to such discovery. An absolute outside limit of six years
from the negligent act is imposed. Connecticut's limitation period is
one year from the date the injury is discovered or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have been discovered, with an outside limit of
three years from the date of negligent act or omission.
Interesting variants appear in the statutes of Delaware and Pennsylvania. Delaware starts its statute running from the date when the "injuries were sustained," while Pennsylvania's provision specifies a period
"from the time when the injury was done." Delaware has not decided
whether it will follow the majority or minority accrual rule. Pennsylvania, in Ayers v. Morgan,4 5 held that where a physician negligently
142 Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555 (La. App. 1934); Fernandi v. StruIly, 35 N.J. 434,
173 A.2d 277 (1961); Note, 41 B.U.L. Rev. 569. Michigan may soon join this group. See
Eschenbacher v. Hier, 363 Mich. 676, 110 N.W.2d 731 (1961).
148 Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 682-83, 277 P.2d 724, 728 (1954).
144 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 516.100 (1952). Cf. Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d
760 (1943), 9 Mo. L. Rev. 102 (1944) (continuous treatment involved).
245 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959), 5 Vill. L. Rev. 495 (1960).
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left a sponge in a patient's body during an operation the injury was
"done" when, nine years later, the patient discovered its presence.
The statutes of Arkansas and Indiana seemingly preclude any possible
construction allowing the period to run from the time of discovery;
both expressly declare that the action must be brought within two years
of the negligent act.
As the above discussion demonstrates, some judicial and a few legislative inroads have been made in the majority view. Nevertheless, a
substantial majority of states follow the rule that the applicable statute
runs from the date of negligence rather than discovery, with a small
though increasing number taking the opposite view. The trend in this
direction is no longer glacial, but it is far from swift.
Continuous Treatment
The earliest attempts to circumvent the malpractice statutes involved
the use of the continuous treatment theory. In Gillette v. Tucker,' 4 the
Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that where a physician negligently left a
sponge in an incision during an operation, and continued to treat the
patient thereafter, the statute of limitations ran from the termination of
the physician-patient relationship. 4 ' The court reasoned:
There was a continuous obligation upon the [physician] .

. . ,

so long as

the relation or employment continued, and each day's failure to remove the
sponge was a fresh breach of the contract implied by the law. The removal
of the sponge was a part of the148operation, and in this respect the surgeon
left the operation uncompleted.
Most states have adopted some variant of this theory as
postponing the running of the malpractice statute. 149 A few
rejected it. 5 9 Among those jurisdictions recognizing the
treatment exception, there is some difference of opinion

a means of
states have
continuous
as to the

67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
147 While the court spoke of continuous treatment, it held that the termination of the
relationship, not the end of the treatment, started the statute running. In most cases the
two dates are the same, but problems sometimes arise. Thus Minnesota, in Schmit v.
Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931), took the position that the date of the last
treatment controls. See Note, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 96, 97 (1935).
148 Gillette v. Tucker, supra note 146, at 133, 65 N.E. at 872.
149 Summers v. Wallace Hosp., 276 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1960); Burton v. Tribble, 189
Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934); Mock v. Santa Monica Hosp., 9 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Dist. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1960); Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 758, 176 S.E. 829 (1934);
Buchanan v. Kull, 323 Mich. 381, 35 N.W.2d 351 (1949); Couillard v. Charles T. Miller
Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96 (1958); Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603,
173 S.W.2d 760 (1943); Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941); Tortorello
v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950); Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Or. 559, 130 P.2d
944 (1942); Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932); Murray v. Allen, 103
Vt. 373, 154 Atl. 678 (1931).
App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795 (1943); Becker v. Floersch,
150 Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Ill.
153 Kan. 374, 110 P.2d 752 (1941); Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957);
McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 55, 44 P.2d 797 (1935).
146
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character of the subsequent treatment required. Minnesota' 5 ' and
Nebraska, 52 for instance, hold that the malpractice statute runs from
the date of the last treatment, any type of treatment apparently being
sufficient. New Jersey' 53 and Oregon, 5 4 on the other hand, require that
the later treatment itself be negligent to postpone the running of the
statute.
The continuous treatment theory is generally rationalized on one or
more of three grounds: (1) the treatment of an ailment must be
considered as a whole;' 5 5 (2) the failure to rectify the negligent act
constituting malpractice is really continuing negligence giving rise to a
single cause of action; 156 and (3) the patient, while the treatment
continues, relies completely on his physician and is under no duty to
inquire into the effectiveness of the latter's measures. 57 No matter what
its justification, the theory remains an attempt to ameliorate in certain
situations the potentially harsh result of the majority accural rule.
Contract Action
In almost all states the contract statute of limitations is longer than
the statute applicable to malpractice actions. Therefore, patients
frequently attempt to frame their complaints in contract when the time
within which-to bring a malpractice action has expired. Three jurisdictions once took the position that an action against a physician always
sounded in contract because the malpractice alleged was a breach of the
employment agreement.' 5 8 One of these, Florida, now appears to be the
only state which gives a plaintiff an election of remedies in every case.
He may sue for malpractice or breach of contract and the appropriate
statute will attach, for "the statutory period applicable to a malpractice
suit depends on the claim for relief stated by plaintiff. . . 219 Kentucky

and Minnesota, the other two states, have adopted specific malpractice
151 Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96 (1948);
Schanil v. Branton, 181 Minn. 381, 232 N.W. 708 (1930); Bush v. Cress, 178 Minn. 482,
227 N.W.432 (1929).
152 Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941).

153 Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950).
154 Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Or. 559, 130 P.2d 944 (1942)

But see note 142 supra.
(failure to remedy negligent

act makes continuous treatment "negligent").
155 Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941); Peteler v. Robinson, 81 Utah
535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932).
156 Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934); Silvertooth v. Shallenberger,
49 Ga. App. 758, 176 S.E. 829 (1934); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 854

(1902).
157 Buchanan v. Kull, 323 Mich. 381, 35 N.W.2d 351
258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932).

(1949); De Haan v. Winter,

158 Slaughter v. Tyler, 126 Fla. 515, 171 So. 320 (1936); Palmer v. Jackson, 62 Fla.
249, 57 So. 240 (1911); Menefee v. Alexander, 107 Ky. 279, 53 S.W. 653 (1899); Burke

v. Mayland, 149 Minn. 481, 184 N.W. 32 (1921); Finch v. Bursheim, 122 Minn. 152, 142
N.W. 143 (1913).
159 Manning v. Serrano, 97 So. 2d 688, 690 (Fla. 1957).
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statutes which have been construed to prevent application of the contract
limitation period to all malpractice actions.16 Indeed, in most states
having a specific malpractice statute of limitations it has been held:
[A] statute of limitation relating specifically to those engaged in the practice of the healing arts .. .shall govern in all actions against physicians
growing out of their practice and regardless of the form
and surgeons
thereof. 161
In jurisdictions having no malpractice statute various approaches
emerge. At least two states, before they enacted malpractice statutes,
apparently took the view that any action framed in contract would be
6 2 Several states deem the
governed by the contract limitation period.
contract statute applicable if the "'act complained of is a breach of
specific terms of the contract, without any reference to the legal duties
imposed by law upon the relationship,' ,,163 but they do not apply it if
the duty breached arises from and is "inseparable from the nature and
exercise of his [the physician's] calling and .. .is predicated by the

law on the relation which exists between physician and patient .... "
Finally, a sizeable number of these states have rejected the contract
65
theory, or at least its availability in the ordinary malpractice context.
The great difficulty with many of the cases, even in states having
malpractice statutes of limitations, is the failure to make an articulate
distinction between ordinary, implied physician-patient contracts and
special or express contracts, i.e. where the physician warrants a cure
166 In the
and thereby raises his duty above the ordinary standard.
160 Roush v. Wolfe, 243 Ky. 180, 47 S.W.2d 1021 (1932); Guess v. Linton, 236 Ky.
87, 32 S.W.2d 718 (1930). The Minnesota cases, without discussing the matter, simply
apply the malpractice statute to all actions based upon medical malpractice.
Accord, Barn161 Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 76, 266 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1954).
hoff v. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931); Cox v. Cartwright, 96 Ohio App.
245, 121 N.E.2d 673 (1953). Contra, Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816
(1957). Cf. Lakeman v. La France, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959) (special contract
actions governed by contract statute).
162 Sellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167 (1923) ; Hickey v. Slattery, 103 Conn. 719,
131 At. 558 (1926).
163 Yeager v. Dunnavan, 26 Wash. 2d 559, 562, 174 P.2d 755, 757 (1946). Accord,
Wilson v. Blair, 65 Mont. 155, 211 Pac. 289 (1922) (contract guaranteeing particular
result allowed) ; Seanor v. Browne, 154 Okl. 222, 7 P.2d 627 (1932) (special contract possible) ; Dowell v. Mossberg, - Or. -, 359 P.2d 541 (1961) (express contract permitted);
Carpenter v. Moore, 51 Wash. 2d 795, 322 P.2d 125 (1958) (contract to perform to
patient's satisfaction upheld).
164 Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 731, 89 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1955).
165 Fadden v. Satterlee, 43 Fed. 568 (S.D. Iowa 1890); Patterson v. Vincent, 44 Del.
442, 61 A.2d 416 (Super. Ct. 1948); Kiersey v. McNeemer, 197 Ill. App. 173 (1915);
Coulter v. Sharp, 145 Kan. 28, 64 P.2d 564 (1937); Weinstein v. Blanchard, 109 N.J.L.
332, 162 Atl. 601 (1932); Griffin v. Woodhead, 30 R.I. 204, 74 Atl. 417 (1909); Bodne
v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 353, 2 S.W.2d 100 (1928); Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252, 12
S.E. 519 (1890); Klingbeil v. Saucerman, 165 Wis. 60, 160 N.W. 1051 (1917).
166 The opinions abound in ambiguous statements like the following: "Whether it be
in tort or on contract it is an action to recover damages for injuries to the person and
comes alike under the terms of the statute. . . ." Klingbeil v. Saucerman, 165 Wis. 60, 62,
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sixteen states other than New York which have malpractice statutes, the
belief that the legislature intended to adopt a comprehensive limiting
statute probably will prevail, and all varieties of contract actions will be
barred. 67 Particularly is this true in light of the language of some of
these statutes, which are drafted to cover actions "whether based on
contract or tort."' 68 Until a uniform pattern of legislation develops,
however, the law as to the availability of a contract remedy against
negligent physicians will remain in the proverbial state of flux. At
present the only settled issue appears to be the near-unanimous rejection
169
of the contract remedy when the gist of the action is negligence.
Fraud Action
The decisions where a patient has attempted a fraud action are scant.
Illinois170 and Wisconsin' 1 ' alone have accepted the argument that the
physician's fraudulent concealment of his negligent act amounts to fraud.
California, 172 Idaho, 173 and Ohio174 have rejected it on the ground that
such a complaint "sets up a cause of action in malpractice, and the
allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation and of intentional concealment ... do not transmute or change the cause of action from one in
has been expressly left
malpractice to one in deceit.' 75 The question
77
17
Dakota.
North
and
Carolina
North
in
open
Whatever be the status of attempts to frame an action for fraud, many
legislatures and courts have realized that it is inequitable to allow a
physician who has misrepresented or concealed his negligence to avoid
liability by the expedient of pleading the malpractice statute of limitations. Several states, therefore, have enacted statutes applicable to
malpractice actions which toll the statute where fraud is involved.
These statutes are essentially of two types. The first kind explicitly
states that the time during which the defendant fraudently conceals the
160 N.W. 1051 (1917). See also Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 353, 356, 2 S.W.2d 100
(1928). Whether such statements preclude the bringing of actions on special contracts is
uncertain.
167 See cases cited at note 161 supra.
168 Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota and South Dakota. Colorado's
statute covers actions whether in tort or "implied contract," thereby leaving open the

possibility that the contract statute may apply to actions on express contracts, such a
contract to cure. Four states have covered this problem by including actions for failure
to cure within the coverage of their malpractice statutes. Alabama, Arkansas, Minnesota
and South Dakota.
169 Florida may be classified as an exception. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
App. 258 (1916).
170 Mills v. Warner, 201 Ill.
171 Krestich v. Stefanez, 243 Wis. 1, 9 N.W.2d 130 (1943).
172 Tell v. Taylor, 12 Cal. Rptr. 648 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
173 Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932).
174 Swankowski v. Diethelm, 98 Ohio App. 271, 129 N.E.2d 182 (1953).
175 Id. at 275, 129 N.E.2d at 185.
176 Nowell v. Hamilton, 249 N.C. 523, 107 SY..2d 112 (1959).
177 Linke v. Sorenson, 276 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1960).
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cause of action is not included in the time limited to sue.'
The second
variety operates in a slightly more indirect fashion. It provides that, if
the defendant obstructs the bringing of an action, the statute is tolled
during the course of his obstruction.' 9 A fraudulent concealment is
clearly an obstruction within the meaning of these statutes. 8 0
Even where such statutes are not in force, the vast majority of courts
have held that a physician's concealment of his negligence tolls the
running of the statute until the fraud is or should reasonably have been
discovered. 8 ' Tolling for fraudulent concealment is considered by these
courts as "an exception... [to the statute of limitations] implied by the
law. .. ."I'2 Since the physician-patient relationship is a confidential

83
one, affirmative acts of concealment need not always be proved;
the duty to disclose being present, a physician's silence is often deemed

sufficient concealment.

8 4

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED STATUTE

The prevention of stale claims, the reason for the statute of limitations, is of course a desirable objective. Where a statute works to bar
claims which are not really stale, however, its desirability is open to
question. Most malpractice statutes, construed by the courts as running
from the date of the physician's negligence, achieve this dubious result.
178 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 3-807 (1936); Breedlove v. Aiken, 85 Ga. App. 719,
70 S.E.2d 85 (1952); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 260, § 12 (1956); Maloney v. Brackett, 275
Mass. 479, 176 N.E. 604 (1931); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.612 (Supp. 1959); Kroll v.
Vanden Berg, 336 Mich. 306, 57 N.W.2d 897 (1953).
179 See, e.g, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.190 (1955); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5404 (Supp.
1959).
180 Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1952); Baker v. Hendrix, 126 W. Va. 37, 27
S.E.2d 275 (1943).
181 See, e.g., Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934); Morrison v. Acton,
68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948) ; Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957) ;
Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 235 N.W. 633 (1931); Lakeman v. La France, 102
N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959); Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J. Super. 225, 164 A.2d 357 (1960);
Moses v. Miller, 202 Okla. 65, 216 P.2d 979 (1950); Dowell v. Mossberg, - Or. -, 355
P.2d 624 (1960) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, - Or.-, 359 P.2d 541 (1961) ; Hinkle v.
Hargens, 76 S.D. 520, 81 N.W.2d 888 (1957); Hall v. De Saussure, 41 Tenn. App. 572, 297
S.W.2d 81, cert. denied, 201 Tenn. 164, 297 S.W.2d 90 (1956); Barnard v. Thompson, 138
Tex. 277, 158 S.W.2d 486 (1942) ; Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 38 P.2d 712 (1934) ; Murray,
v. Allen, 103 Vt. 373, 154 AtI. 678 (1931). Cf. Bernath v. Le Fever, 325 Pa. 43, 189
At. 342 (1937). Contra, Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932);
Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917); Graham v. Updegraph, 144 Kan. 45,
58 P.2d 475 (1936); McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 55, 44 P.2d 797 (1935). See generally
Louisell & Williams, supra note 40, at 375.
182 Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 106, 138 N.E.2d 891, 894 (1956).
383 Ibid. See also Kroll v. Vanden Berg, 336 Mich. 306, 57 N.W.2d 897 (1953);
Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 235 N.W. 633 (1931). Compare Dawson, supra note
104, at 904-06.
184 Louisell & Williams, supra note 40, at 376: "The most extreme position that has
been taken is that actual knowledge by the physician is not necessary where he was
negligent in not discovering the injury. This position essentially is equivalent to holding that in malpractice cases the statute tolls until the injury is discovered."
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As a leading commentator on medical jurisprudence noted twenty-five
years ago:
This rule of law has, however, been the object of repeated criticism.
It is pointed out that promptness of action presupposes knowledge of the
existence of conditions which warrant such action, and that it is ununtil he has
reasonable to expect a person to bring suit for malpractice
actual knowledge of facts which constitute the wrong.' 8 5
Not only does the character of medical malpractice frequently preclude its discovery within a two year period, but the very relationship
of physician-patient, with its attributes of trust and confidence, often
prevents its prompt discovery. 18 6 Indeed, the present law of malpractice
would often allow a dishonest physician to lull his patient into sleeping
on his rights, while subjecting the honest physician who discloses his
negligent treatment to liability.187 The only possible safeguard against
having an action barred in many instances would be to switch physicians,
an occurrence the physician-patient relationship tends to discourage."8
Legal commentators in New York 8 9 and other states 90 have unanimously taken the position that a medical malpractice statute should not
begin to run until the patient has discovered that he has been the victim
of malpractice. The Law Revision Commission' 91 and the Committee on
Medical Jurisprudence of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York 92 have recommended enactment of such a statute. Even statistics
gathered by the American Medical Association suggest that a liberalization of New York law would not be out of order. Although having
9.84 per cent of the country's population and 15.30 per cent of its
physician population in 1950, New York had only 7.93 per cent of its
malpractice cases. 9 3 Similarly, New York's rank by incidence of
185 Oppenheimer, A Treatise on Medical Jurisprudence 113 (1935).
186 Note, 21 St. John's L. Rev. 77, 79 (1946). See also Note, 12 Sw. L.J. 139, 141
(1958).
187 Notes, 11 W. Res. L. Rev. 299, 301 (1960); 12 Wyo. L.J. 30, 37 (1957); 13 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 264 (1956).
188 Note, 9 Mo. L. Rev. 102, 105 (1944). "It is certainly both unreasonable and impractical to require a patient to go to another doctor immediately after an operation to
ascertain if the operation has been performed correctly." Note, 12 Wyo. L.J. 30, 37 (1957).
189 See note 30 supra.
190 Comments, "The Forgotten Sponge and the Statute of Limitations," 1 Washburn
L.J. 257, 272 (1961); "Statute of Limitations in an Action of Malpractice," 64 Dick. L.
Rev. 173, 179 (1960); Notes, 5 Vill. L. Rev. 495, 498 (1960); 42 Iowa L. Rev. 97, 102
(1956); 35 Mich. L. Rev. 838, 840 (1937).
191 See note 31 supra.
192 See note 32 supra.
393 Note, "Court Decisions-Medical Professional Liability," 164 J.A.M.A. 1349 (1957).
These and other statistics also may be found in Stetler, "The History of Reported Medical
Professional Liability Cases," 30 Temp. L.Q. 366, 370 (1957). An even greater statistical
disparity would occur if many unreported trial and appellate court decisions from other
states were capable of computation. New York, of course, reports most trial and appellate
court opinions. See Note, supra, at 1349.
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professional liability suits per physician fell from a low 37th for the
period 1910-1925 to 42d from 1925-1940 and 43d from 1940-1955.'
Undoubtedly, these statistics reflect the fact that New York's present
statute has precluded many patients from instituting malpractice
action. 195
Since remedial legislation is obviously desirable, the problem becomes
one of drafting a satisfactory statute. Several questions are present.
First, to whom should the statute apply? Second, to what actions should
it apply? Third, when should the statutory period start running? Fourth,
what factors, if any, should toll the statute?
As to coverage, the continued use of the term "malpractice" would
appear to be satisfactory unless a wider group is to be brought within
the statute's purview. The term refers to the professional negligence of
physicians, surgeons, dentists, and the like. 9 ' To avoid any possible
misunderstanding as to the statute's scope,' 97 the phrase "medical
malpractice" might be used. Medical writers often use this phraseology, 9 ' although sometimes with a noticeable lack of enthusiasm.' 9
Use of the term "malpractice," even with the "medical" modification,
would exclude nurses and hospital employees from the statute's coverage.2°° Similarly, the liability of a hospital for the negligent acts of such
personnel is in negligence and the three year statute of limitations
applies.20 ' Prior to 1957, when the Court of Appeals decided Bing v.
Thunig,20 e physicians working in hospitals were deemed independent
contractors; while the hospital could be held liable for its negligence in
20
selecting a doctor, it was not responsible for the latter's malpractice. 3
194

Sandor, supra note 90, at 465.

195 See note 34 supra.

196 See notes 3-10 supra.
197 See notes 11-12 supra.
198 Morris, "Res Ipsa Loqutur-Liability Without Fault," 163 JA.MA. 1055, 1056
(1957).
199 "Malpractice" is an unfortunate word, because it so commonly implies that its
victim [sic] is a bad doctor. This is not so. The best trained and most conscientious
physician may err in a particular case.. . . Legally, no generalization is implied or
warranted. Further, "malpractice" as a rule of law is not limited to physicians; it
applies to all professional services furnished on a contract basis. [Sic] ....
A more accurate term for physicians' legal responsibility would be "professional
tort liability." However, "malpractice" is imbedded in both legal and medical literature
and habit of thought, so its use no doubt will continue.
Hassard, 'Professional Liability Claims Prevention," 163 JAM.A. 1267 (1957).
200 See note 10 supra.
201 Wolff v. Jamaica Hosp., 11 App. Div. 2d 801, 205 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1960);
Gautieri v. New Rochelle Hosp. Ass'n, 4 App. Div. 2d 874, 166 N.Y.S.2d 934 (2d Dep't
1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 952, 157 N.E.2d 172, 183 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1959).
202 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
203 Roewekamp v. New York Post Graduate Medical School & Hosp., 254 App. Div.
265, 4 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't 1938) (malpractice statute inapplicable in action against
hospital for negligence in selecting physician).
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The Bing holding, as construed by lower courts 04 and legal writers,1°5
is that hospitals, under traditional principles of respondeat superior, are
responsible for acts of their staff physicians and internes as well as
nurses and employees. Whether hospitals may utilize the malpractice
20 6
statute in physician and interne cases is an open question.
Reference to the medical personnel covered by the provisions of the
sixteen other states having special malpractice statutes is helpful in
determining whether to expand the statute's coverage. Four of these
states, like New York at present, do not attempt to specify those
covered. 7 Of the dozen states spelling out those coming under their
statutes, twelve mention physicians, 08 eleven include surgeons, 20 9 ten
specify dentists,2 10 and seven list hospitals and sanitaria. 211 Thereafter,
the pattern breaks down. Chiropractors and chiropodists are included in
Colorado and Connecticut, midwives in Colorado, nurses in Missouri,
optometrists in Massachusetts, osteopaths in Colorado, and roentgenologists in Missouri. 12 Two states have "open end" provisions:
Indiana, after listing those falling under its statute, includes "or others,"
and Maine adds "all others engaged in the healing art."
In the opinion of this writer, the statute's coverage should be left
unchanged, allowing the courts freedom to apply the statute to those
medical personnel deemed to fall within its scope. However, strong
arguments can be mustered that the increased utilization of hospitals
since New York's present statute was enacted in 1900 and the unitary
nature of modern medical treatment require that hospitals and sanitaria
be specifically covered by the statute. Since more field research seems
necessary before such a step is taken, this writer prefers to retain the
status quo in this respect, leaving the possibility of including hospitals
and sanitaria to a later day.
20- Morwin v. Albany Hosp., 7 App. Div. 2d 582, 185 N.Y.S.2d 85 (3rd Dep't 1959);
Hollant v. North Shore Hosp, 24 Misc. 2d 892, 206 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1960).
205 Willcox, "Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine," 45 Cornell L.Q. 432,
484 n.160 (1960); Thornton & McNiece, "Torts and Workmen's Compensation," 1957
Survey of N.Y. Law, 32 N.Y.U.,. Rev. 1465, 1480 (1957); Note, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1041,

1043 (1957).

206 But see Ferraro v. New York Univ., 13 Misc. 2d 131, 177 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 1958) (physician alone pleaded malpractice statute in action against
physician and hospital).
207 Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota and Ohio.
208 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado ("any person licensed to practice medicine"), Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri and South
Dakota.
20 See, with the exception of Maine, those states listed in note 208 supra.
210 See, with the exception of Maine and Kentucky, those states listed in note 208 supra.
211 Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri and South
Dakota.
212 Among those classes of medical personnel unmentioned in the twelve statutes are
anesthesiologists, dermatologists, osteopaths and podiatrists.
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The second problem involved in drafting remedial legislation concerns
the types of actions to which the statute should apply. Unless the
availability of the contract remedy and the continuous treatment theory
are negated by the statute, the possibility exists that New York courts
might consider such fictions still available. Enough has been shown
above to demonstrate their unsatisfactory character. 13 Adopted by the
courts as a means of circumventing the present malpractice statute, they
often work inequities on both physicians and patients, and their need is
obviated by the type of statute recommended below. To insure the
abolition of the contract action, a provision should be included, similar
to that found in the malpractice statutes of seven states, making the
statute applicable to all malpractice actions whether based on contract
or tort.2 14 The continuous treatment theory is jettisoned by the accrual

rule recommended below.
The third and major problem concerns when the statute begins to
run. Upon this decision turns the related question of the length of the
statutory period. The 1942 Law Revision Commission proposal retained
the traditional approach of running the statute from the accrual of the
cause of action but, taking into account the criticism of the courts'
construction of this language, added the important proviso that "the
cause of action in such a case is not deemed to have accrued until the
discovery by the injured person of the facts constituting the malpractice,
but this provision shall not permit commencement of such an action after
six years from the occurrence of such malpractice.2 15 The two year
period found in section 50 was reduced to one year for reasons left
unexplained. This suggested statute has been called "the model answer
to this problem." 6
The 1958 proposal of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York follows the Commission's basic pattern, but it retains the two year
immunity "four
statutory period of section 50 and provides an 2 absolute
17
years after the commission of the malpractice.;

The proposed revision of the Civil Practice Act represents an unsatisfactory compromise with the above two proposals. Section 214(6)
See text at notes 50 and 85-93 supra.
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado ("implied contract"), Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota and South Dakota.
215 Recommendations of the Law Revision Comm'n to the Legislature, Leg. Doc. No.
65(E) at 14, Report N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n at 142 (1942).
216 Note, 21 St. John's L. Rev. 77, 80 (1946).
217 " 'A cause of action for malpractice is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the plaintiff or the person under whom he claims of the facts constituting the
malpractice, but in no event may such action be commenced more than four years after
the commission of the malpractice.'" Committee on Medical jurisprudence, supra note 11,
at 467-68.
213
214
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of the 1961 proposed bill, a three year statute, governs a malpractice
action.21 The reason for extending the permissible period, the Advisory
Committee on Practice and Procedure explained, was that "in many
actions for malpractice the effect of the tort and the fact that it has
occurred is not known promptly to the person injured."21' 9 Allowing
three years in which to bring all malpractice actions seems unwarranted,
and placing an absolute bar on all actions after this period would
certainly not handle many where malpractice is not readily discoverable.
In the six New York cases from which meaningful statistics could be
gleaned, the mean time span from the date of the malpractice to its
discovery was three years and two months, and in the seventeen cases
where relevant facts were available the average lapse of time from the
commission of malpractice to the commencement of suit was three years
and four months.
Two states having malpractice statutes start them running when the
malpractice is discovered. Alabama's two year statute runs from the
negligent act, but,
if the cause of action is not discovered and could not reasonably have
been discovered within such period, the action may be commenced within six months from the date of discovery or the date of discovery of facts
which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier, provided further that in no event may the action be commenced more than
six years after such act.
The statute is noteworthy for its qualification of the discovery rule, in
that possession of facts which would reasonably lead to discovery suffices
to start the statute. Also, if the discovery provision is relied upon the
plaintiff must begin his action with the shorter, six month period. The
absolute six year bar accords with the Commission's 1942 proposal.
218 Senate Bill No. 26, Int. 26, Jan., 1961. Section 5.14 of the 1960 study bill, a three
year personal injury statute, formerly was to cover the "tort" of malpractice. See Senate
Bill No. 26, Int. 26, Jan., 1960 and Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts,
Leg. Doc. No. 13 at 71 (1958). According to the drafters of the 1961 bill, specific reference
"to an action to recover damages for malpractice was added on the suggestion that malpractice involving property damage--e.g., against an accountant-may be based on a contract theory and would otherwise be governed by the six year provision unless specific
reference was made." Final Report of the Advisory Comm. on Practice and Procedure,
Leg. Doc. No. 15 at - (1961). This statement indicates considerable confusion about what
persons and what actions fall within a "malpractice" provision. In the first place, the
problem of accountants is in no way solved by the 1961 bill, since they have never been
deemed to fall under a malpractice statute. See note 12 supra. Secondly, merely specifying
a time period for malpractice actions would not achieve the drafters' purpose of abolishing contract actions, which are permitted now despite the existence of a reference to malpractice in § 50(1). In this writer's opinion, § 214(6) would permit both the maintenance
of contract actions and the use of the continuous treatment theory. These defects alone
deprive the proposed section of most of its remedial value.
219 Report of the Temporary Comm'n on the Courts, Leg. Doc. 13 at 538 (1958).
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Connecticut's statute requires the action to be brought
within one year from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered,
and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from
the date of the act or omission complained of ...
This statute shortens the permissible period in which to bring an action
to one year, like the Commission's 1942 proposal, and follows the latter,
unlike Alabama's approach, in applying its time period across-the-board.
However, the statute varies from the Commission's model in that the
discovery rule is qualified and a short absolute period of three years is
adopted.
In considering remedial legislation for New York, several policy
choices must be made at this point. It is this writer's opinion that the
most satisfactory statute would include a two year, across-the-board
period, a discovery accrual provision,2 20 and an absolute limitation period
of six years. Applying such a statute to the seventeen New York cases
containing sufficient factual data to make application meaningful, it
appears that such a statute would have barred only one action.22 '
The fourth and final problem presented in drafting a new malpractice
statute is the factors, if any, which should toll the statute. If the
discovery doctrine is utilized, the need for tolling the statute by means
of the continuous treatment theory or other fiction disappears. Many
states have held that fraudulent concealment postpones the running of
the statute, but no state has explicitly provided so in its malpractice
statute. Certainly, such a provision would be unnecessary if a discoverytype statute is proposed, for it would be a rare case where a physician
could conceal his malpractice for over a six year absolute period.
There is one situation, however, where a tolling of the statute might be
warranted. The malpractice statute of limitations is shorter than the
limitation period applied to a physician's action for his services, and
physicians have been repeatedly advised to postpone instituting actions
until the malpractice statute has run.
When the physician does sue,
the patient with a malpractice claim finds that the statute prevents him
Although a rule postponing the period until the plaintiff reasonably should learn
of the harm might require a determination of "reasonableness" in each case, and the
advantage of "keeping easy cases out of court" might be lost, yet the burden on the
courts probably would not be unduly increased, for the number of "inherently unknowable" injuries would necessarily be small and exceptions to the rule that ignorance
is immaterial have already been recognized.
Comment, "Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177,
220

1204-05 (1950).

22 Ranalli v. Breed, 251 App. Div. 750, 297 N.Y. Supp. 688 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd,
277 N.Y. 630, 14 N.E.2d 195 (1938).
222 Sandor, supra note 90, at 464. See also Note, 'Professional Liability and Statutes
of Limitation," 164 J.A.WA. 187, 189 (1957).
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from pleading his claim as a defense or counterclaim.1 3 Minnesota and
South Dakota have recently enacted statutes permitting a barred
malpractice claim to be interposed as a defense to a physician's action
for services, if it was the property of the party pleading it at the time it
became barred and was not barred at the time the claim sued on
originated. When such a defense is pleaded, no judgment except for
costs can be rendered in favor of the party pleading it.24 Such a
provision is worth inclusion in any new statute.
Incorporating the above conclusions in a proposed new statute for
New York, this writer strongly urges that section 50 of the Civil
Practice Act be amended as follows:
§ 50. Actions to be commenced within two years. The following actions
must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has
accrued:
1. An action to recover damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment [,] or malicious prosecution [or malpractice].
2. An action upon a statute for a forfeiture or penalty to the people
of the state.
3. An action to recover damages for medical malpractice. A cause of
action for medical malpractice, whether based on tort, contract or any
other theory, against a physician, surgeon, dentist, or others rendering
similar professional services, is deemed to have accrued upon the discovery
by the. plaintiff or the person under whom he claims of the facts constituting the malpractice, but this provision shall not permit commencement of such an action after six years from the occurrence of suck medical malpractice. The facts constituting the malpractice may be pleaded
as a defense to an action for services brought by a physician, surgeon,
dentist, or others rendering similar professional services, after the limitations herein prescribed, notwithstanding that an action for such malpractice is barred by this section.
23 Garben v. McKittrick, 225 App. Div. 772, 232 N.Y. Supp. 390 (2d Dep't 1928);

Fish v. Conley, 221 App. Div. 609, 225 N.Y. Supp. 27 (3d Dep't 1927).
224 Compare Connecticut's ambiguous statute.
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APPENDIX I
MALPRACTICE STATUTES

OF OTHER STATES

Ala. Code tit. 7, § 25(1) (1960)..
All actions against physicians and surgeons, and dentists for malpractice, error, mistake,
or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort, must be commenced within two years
next after the act or omission or failure giving rise to the cause of action, and not afterwards. Provided that if the cause of action is not discovered and could not reasonably
have been discovered within such period, then the action may be commenced within six
months from the date of such discovery or the date of discovery of facts which would
reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier, provided further that in no event
may the action be commenced more than six years after .such act.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 37-205 (1P47)
Hereafter all actions of contract or tort for malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to
treat or cure, against physicians, surgeons, dentists, hospitals, and sanitaria, shall be commenced within two [2] years after the cause of action accrues. The date of the accrual
of the cause of action shall be date of the wrongful act complained of, and no other time.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 87-1- (1953)
No person shall be permitted to maintain an action, whether such action sound in tort
or implied contract, to recover damages from any person licensed to practice medicine,
chiropractic, osteopathy, chiropody, midwifery or dentistry on account of the alleged negligence of such person in the practice of the profession for which he is licensed or on account
of his failure to possess or exercise that degree of skill which he actually or impliedly
represented, promised or agreed that he did possess and would exercise, unless such action
be instituted within two years after such cause of action accrued.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-58" t(1958)
No action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by . . . malpractice
of a physician, surgeon, dentist, chiropodist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be
brought but within one year from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such
action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be intersposed in any such action any time
before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-627 (1946)
No action of any kind for damages, whether brought in contract or tort, based upon
professional services rendered or which should have been rendered, shall be brought, commenced or maintained, in any of the courts of this state against physicians, dentists, surgeons, hospitals, sanitariums, or others, unless said action is filed within two [2) years
from the date of the act, omission or neglect complained of.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.440 (1959)
(1) The following actions shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action
accrued:
(e)

An action against a physician or surgeon for negligence or malpractice.

112
, § 93 (i954)
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch.
and
all others engaged in the healing art
of
physicians
for
.
.
.
malpractice
Actions
shall be commenced within 2 years after the cause of action accrues.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 260, § 4 (Supp. 1960)
[A]ctions of contract or tort for malpractice, error or mistake against physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, hospitals and sanitaria . . . shall be commenced only within
two years next after the cause of action accrues. ...
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.605 (Sup,. 1959)
3. Actions . . . for malpractice of physicians, surgeons or dentists . . . shall be brought
within 2 years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not afterwards. ...
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Minn. Stat. Ann. -§ 541.07 (Supp. 1960)
The following actions shall be commenced within two years:
(1) [A]II actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, hospitals, sanitariums, for malpractice, error, mistake or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort; provided a
counterclaim may be pleaded as a defense to any action for services brought by a physician, surgeon, dentist, hospital or sanitarium, after the limitations herein described notwithstanding it is barred by the provisions of this chapter, if it was the property of the
party pleading it at the time it became barred and was not barred at the time the claim
sued on originated, but no judgment thereof except for costs can be rendered in favor
of the party so pleading it ...
Mo. Ann. .Stat. § 516.140 (1952)
All actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, roentgenologists, nurses, hospitals and
sanitariums for damages for milpractice, error, or mistake shall be brought within two
years from the date of the act of neglect complained of...
Neb. Rev! Stat. § 2j,-208 (1956)
The following actions can only be brought within the periods herein stated: . . . within
two years, an action for malpractice.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4 (1955)
[Aictions for malpractice . . . may be brought within two years . . . after the cause
of action accrued, and not afterward.
N.D. Century Code Ann. § 28-01-18 (1960)
The following actions must be commenced within two years after the cause of action
has accrued:
3. An action for the recovery of damages resulting from malpractice ...
Ohio Rev..Code Ann. § 2305.11 (Page 1958)
An action for . . . malpractice . . . shall be brought within one year after the cause
thereof accrued ....
S.D. Code § 33.0232 (Supp. 1960)
Except where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute, civil actions
other than for the recovery of real property can be commenced only within the following
specified periods of time after the cause of action shall have accrued:
(6)

Within two years:
(c)

An action against a physician, surgeon, dentist, hospital, or sanitarium for
malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure, whether based on contract or
tort; provided, a counterclaim may be pleaded as a defense to any action for
services brought by a physician, surgeon, dentist, hospital, or sanitarium, after
the limitations herein prescribed, notwithstanding it is barred by the provisions of this chapter, if it was the property of the party pleading it at the
time it became barred and was not barred at the time the claim sued on
originated, but no judgment thereon except for costs can be rendered in favor
of the party so pleading it ...
APPENDIX II
RELEVANT STATUTES OF OTVER STATES

Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 55-2- (1949); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-542 (1956); Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 340 (1954); DeL Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8118 (Supp. 1960); D.C. Code
Ann. § 12-201 (1952); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11 (1960); Ga. Cide Ann. § 3-1004 (1936);
Hawaii RevLaws § 241-7 (Supp. 1960); Idaho Code Ann. § 5-219 (1948); Ill. Stat. Ann.
§ 83.15 (Jones Supp. 1956); Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1 (1950); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-306 (1950); La. Stat. Ann., Civ. Code Art. 3536 (1953); Id. Ann. Code, art. 57, § 1
(1957); Miss. Code Ann. § 722 (1957); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-2605 (1949); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 11.190 (1960); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14-2 (1952); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-8
(1953); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 (1953); Okl. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 95 (1960); Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 12-110 (1959); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 12, § 34 (1953); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § g-1-14
(1956); S.C. Code § 10-143 (1952); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-304 (1955); Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. art. 5526 (1958); Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 512
(1958); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8-33, 8-24 (1957); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080 (1956); W. Va.
Code Ann. § 5404 (Supp. 1959); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 330.205 (Supp. 1961); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 1-18 (1959).

